To the memory of Andrei Kolmogorov, In the 100th year since his birth (4/25/1903 (This is unrelated to, well studied before, complexity quantifications of the usual Gödel effects.) I consider extensions U of the universal partial recursive predicate (or, say, Peano Arithmetic). I prove that any U either leaves an n-bit input (statement) unresolved or contains nearly all information about the n-bit prefix of any r.e. real ρ (which is n bits for some ρ). I argue that creating significant information about a specific math sequence is impossible regardless of the methods used. Similar problems and answers apply to other unsolvability results for tasks allowing non-unique solutions, e.g., non-recursive tilings.
1 Introduction.
D.Hilbert asked if Peano Arithmetic (PA: consisting of logic and algebraic axioms and an infinite family of Induction Axioms) can be consistently extended to a complete theory. The question was somewhat vague since an obvious answer was "yes": just add to PA axioms a maximal consistent set, clearly existing albeit hard to find. 1 K.Gödel formalized this question as existence, among such extensions, of recursively enumerable (r.e.) ones and gave it a negative answer. Its mathematical essence is the absence of total recursive extensions of universal partial recursive predicate.
This negative answer apparently was never accepted by Hilbert, and Gödel himself [Gödel 61 ] had reservations: "Namely, it turns out that in the systematic establishment of the axioms of mathematics, new axioms, which do not follow by formal logic from those previously established, again and again become evident. It is not at all excluded by the negative results mentioned earlier that nevertheless every clearly posed mathematical yes-or-no question is solvable in this way. For it is just this becoming evident of more and more new axioms on the basis of the meaning of the primitive notions that a machine cannot imitate."
As is well known, the absence of algorithmic solutions is no obstacle when the requirements do not make a solution unique. A notable example is generating strings of linear Kolmogorov complexity, e.g., those that cannot be compressed to half their length. Algorithms fail, but a set of dice does a perfect job! 2 Thus, while r.e. sets of axioms cannot complete PA, completion by other realistic means remained a possibility. In fact, it is easy to construct an r.e. theory R that, like PA, allows no consistent completion with r.e. axiom sets. Yet, [Barzdin 69, Jockusch, Soare 72] showed that this theory (though not PA itself) allows a recursive set of pairs of axioms such that random choice of one in each pair assures such completion with probability 99%.
Of course, Gödel's remark envisioned more sophisticated ways to choose axioms :-). However, the impossibility of a task can be formulated more generically. [Kolmogorov 65 ] defined a concept of mutual information in two finite strings. It can be refined and extended to infinite sequences, so that it satisfies conservation inequalities: cannot be increased by deterministic algorithms or in random processes or with any combinations of both. In fact, it seems reasonable to assume that no physically realizable process can increase information about a specific sequence.
In this framework one can ask if non-mechanical means could really enable the Hilbert-Gödel task of consistent completion for PA (as they do for the artificial system R just mentioned). A negative answer follows from the existence of a specific sequence ρ that has infinite mutual information with all total extensions of a universal partial recursive predicate. ρ plays a role of a password: no substantial information about it can be guessed, no matter what methods are allowed.
Note that invoking Gödel's name, does not mean my intent to consider widely discussed complexity aspects and implications of incompleteness theorem. In particular, I ignore complexity of completions of PA. Much of this was considered in the 60-s, 3 but does not answer our question: are such completions really possible? Strings of any complexity are easy to generate.
There are other interesting situations with a similar gap between the proven result and its usual interpretation. Let me mention tiling, a cute task studied in many areas of CS, Math, Physics, etc. A tile is a unit size square with colored edges. A palette is a finite set of tiles with copies of which one can tile the plane so that the colors of adjacent tiles match. Classical papers by Berger, Meyers, and others constructed palettes P that can tile an infinite plane, but only non-recursively, which is typically interpreted as an impossibility of tiling. That is, all programs t(i, j) ∈ P have bounds on sizes n of squares S n = {i, j < n} they tile so that t(S n ) can appear on P -tiled planes. [Durand, Levin, Shen 01 ] pushes these results to the limit, with a palette for which n < t . Such palettes, thus, only allow tilings with square borders of maximal complexity. This stronger result, though, makes the standard interpretation suspicious: may these borders be just random, thus easy to tile with dice? Or could more sophisticated and yet realistic means work?
For some palettes this is, indeed, the case, but not for all. Like all co-r.e. sets, the set of planar tilings with any given palette has members with information about any specific sequence growing with radius n as slowly as log n. Still, this bound cannot be improved for some palettes. The same holds for complete extensions of universal p.r.p. and formal systems. Thus, Gödel Theorem is not really misleading. The proof does not seem to be obvious and is the main point of this article.
Complexity Tools.
Conventions. Let R, I Q, I N, B={0, 1}, S=B * , Ω=B I N be, respectively, the sets of non-negative reals, rationals, integers, bits, finite, and infinite binary sequences (I N, S usually identified); x [n] is the n-bit prefix and x is the bit-length of x∈S. A real function f and its values are enumerable or r.e. (co-r.e. for −f ) if its subgraph {(x, q) : f (x) > q ∈ I Q} is. Elementary (f ∈E) are functions f : Ω → I Q depending on a finite number of digits. Majorant is an r.e. function largest, up to a constant factor, among r.e. functions in its class.
2.1 Integers: Complexity, Randomness. 
Integers: Information.
In particular, x=(a, b) distributed with µ=m ⊗ m, is a pair of two independent, but otherwise completely generic, finite objects. Then,
is seen as deficiency of independence and also measures mutual information in a, b. It was shown (see [ZL 70] ) by Kolmogorov and Levin to be close (within ±O(log K(a, b))) to the expression K(a)−K(a|b) of [Kolmogorov 65] . Unlike this earlier expression (see [Gacs 74 ]), our I is symmetric and monotone: I(a : b) ≤ I((a, a ′ ) : b)+O(1) (which will allow extending I to Ω); it equals K(a) − K(a|(b, K(b)))±O(1) and satisfies the following Independence Conservation Inequalities [L 74, L 84]: For any computable transformation A and measure µ, and some family t a,b of µ-tests
(The O(1) error terms reflect the constant complexities of A, µ.) So, independence of a from b is preserved in random processes, in deterministic computations, their combinations, etc. These inequalities are not obvious (and false for the original 1965 expression I(a : b)=K(a)−K(a/b) ) even with A, say, simply cutting off half of a. An unexpected aspect of I is that x contains all information about k=K(x), I(x : k) = K(k)±O(1), despite K(k|x) being ∼ k or ∼ log x , in the worst case [Gacs 74] . One can view this as an "Occam Razor" effect: with no initial information about it, x is as hard to obtain as its simplest (k-bit) description. All the above works as well for the I z variation of I allowing all algorithms access to oracle z.
Randomness and Information for Reals.
We now extend the above concepts to reals α∈Ω. This abstraction is often convenient (if not taken too far) for concealing O(1) terms and other small mismatches in formulas for finite objects. A measure on Ω is a function µ(x)=µ(x0)+µ(x1), for x∈S. Its mean µ(f ) is a linear functional on E: µ(f +g)=µ(f )+µ(g). It extends to other functions, as usual. µ-tests are lower semi-continuous f , µ(f )≤1; computable µ have a universal (i.e., majorant r.e.) µ-test T µ . The deficiency of
Martin-Lof µ-random are those reals α with d(α|µ) < ∞. P. Martin-Lof noted that some random reals are definable in arithmetic. In fact, the smallest in [0, 1] [Kucera, Slaman 01] ). 4 (Any random r.e. ρ is n m(n) for some universal m: ρ dominates all such sums and replacing m with m+x/i for an r.e. x concentrated in 0, preserves universality. Let an algorithm A transform uniform distribution λ into a semimeasure A(λ)≤µ. Then 4 Indeed, let t a,b (x) be 1 for a < x < b and 0 elsewhere. Let an r.e. T = i cit a i ,b i be an r.e. test with T (X+Y )=∞, i ci(bi−ai)≤1. Since X, Y, T are r.e. , we can modify T by blocking the intervals (ai, bi) if ai≥X+Y or shifting them by yi < Y to (ai−yi, bi−yi) with ai−yi < X. Then T remains an r.e. test with T (X)=∞.
Conversely, let Z, X ∈ [0, 1] be enumerated as Z= sup i zi, X=2 k sup i xi, x −k X dominates X. Otherwise si−1 < Z < si=si−1+x ′ for some i, so t k (Z)=1 for all k and T (Z)=∞.
Consistent Objects.
Consistency of theories and of other objects can be expressed as membership in co-r.e. sets of reals. It is convenient to define such sets via co-r.e. trees, i.e., infinite sets T ⊂S containing all prefixes and some extensions of each member. LetT be the set of those ω ∈ Ω with all prefixes in T . Some co-r.e. trees have only strings of linear Kolmogorov complexity. Contrast this with Proposition 1 For each β ∈ Ω, each co-r.e. tree T has α ∈T with I(α [n] : β) ≤ 5 log n+O(1).
Lemma 1 For each co-r.e. tree T there is a measure µ(x)=µ(x0)+µ(x1) with µ(T ) > 1/2, computable as µ(x)=G(x, ρ [5 log x ] ) by an algorithm G using 5 log x digits of a hint ρ ∈ Ω.
Lemma 1 implies Proposition 1. Indeed, algorithms can transform uniform distribution of inputs ω into any computable one; same holds for computations with oracle ρ. Consider an algorithm using ρ to compute µ and transforming ω into a µ-distributed α (∈T with high probability).
; random ω cannot add information with high probability, and the algorithm cannot increase it either (due to conservation inequalities).
Proof of Lemma 1: G uses ρ to list all converging k-bit programs. As [Barzdin 68 ] noted, for this it needs just one of them, the slowest. ρ can be any r.e. real with K(ρ [n] )=k=n−o(n), e.g., a random one. Programs that use ρ [n] waiting for enumeration of ρ's lower bounds to exceed ρ [n] , are slower than any programs P of complexity < k−2 log n: otherwise ρ [n] can be generated from P, n. G computes µ recursively in slices µ i (x) for x =n=2 2 i , assuming µ i−1 already computed. It will approximate T ∩ B n as T i =T i (ρ) by limited co-enumeration and distribute µ i−1 (x) uniformly on all n-bit extensions of x (which always exist in T ).
Let h i be the Shannon entropy of µ i , with the fractional part rounded up to 2 log 2i bits. Given µ i−1 , shrinking T i lowers h i . G uses ρ to compute the least possible h i and co-enumerates T i until it reaches this bound. Rounding h i , leaves a fraction f i of x ∈ T i \ T . Yet, i f i < 1/2.
In particular, randomized algorithms can generate strings of length ≥ n of any co-r.e. tree T with probability 1/k 2 n, k=⌈log n⌉ by guessing k, ⌊log T ∩ B 2 k ⌋.
Example: Tiling
An illustration is the tiling question from the introduction. [Durand, Levin, Shen 01] constructs a palette P forcing, on each P -tiling, high complexity of all horizontal tile strings not crossing one specific column. The same construction works if complexity restriction is replaced with membership in any bi-tree, i.e., a (co-r.e.) tree containing all substrings (not only prefixes) of its members. To use it, we need to encode any co-r.e. tree T as an equivalent bi-tree T 2 .
Let b(2 k (2l+1)) df = (l mod 2). The pattern of b(n) for 2 a consecutive n determines the a−2 tail bits of n. Let i double each bit of i and alter the result's first bit. If n ends with k followed by k , let sf(n) df =k. LetT 1 be a tree of sequences α : I N→B 2 such that α(n)=(b(n), t) and for some s∈T , whenever sf(n) is defined, t=s(sf(n)). Let T 2 be a bi-tree of all segments of members ofT 1 . Each n-bit T 2 -string represents the first n/O( n 2 ) bits 5 of a T -string s.
In particular, T (and T 2 ) can force s to be random i.e., have maximal complexity. This illustrates the point: all such tilings are highly non-recursive, yet easy to generate (with dice). They can be expressed in a formal system that allows trivial completions but no recursive ones.
The Taboo.
The above example does not show that all co-r.e. trees, such as tilings with an arbitrary palette, allow easily generated members. Proposition 1 sets a small but growing bound on the information needed for that, leaving open the question the article started with. It is resolved by the following observation central to this paper. We represent in Ω partial predicates as their graphs listed in arbitrary order. Let u be a universal partial recursive predicate (p.r.p ).
Theorem 1 Let ρ ∼n be an n+K(n) bit prefix of a random r.e. real ρ and U be a partial predicate that on B n is a total extension 6 of u. Then I(U :
(This almost suffices to compute ρ ∼n from the B n -restriction U n of U and K(U n ). Same holds for all r.e. ρ since they reduce to same-length segments of any random one. The K(K(n)|n) decrement is small; yet [Gacs 74 ] ingeniously proves it ∼ log log n, not O(1).))
Proof. We define a p.r.p. P : S→B inductively on B n . If x=0 n or P (x−1) is defined, let m x,i denote the combined universal measure Q m(Q|n) of all total predicates Q on B n that agree with P on [0 n , x−1] and Q(x) =i∈B. Then P (x) enumerates lower bounds for m x,i until either exceeds 2 −n and yields P (x)=i, decreasing i m x+1,i by >2 −n . For some x n , m xn,i ≤2 −n and P diverges on [x n , 1 n ] with Q m(Q|n)≤2/2 n for all total extensions Q of P on B n .
For all such Q, this bound allows 2 n /O(1)-fold increase of m(Q|x n ), 7 compared to just m(Q|n) = m(K(n)|n)m(Q)/O(m(n)). Now, u(px), with a fixed p, computes P (x), and U (px) extends P (x) on B n to a total Q n , with m(Q n |U ) = m(n)/O(1). Also, x n , ρ ∼n , K(n) = ρ ∼n −n are r.e., so can be computed from one of them whose enumeration ends latest. This could only be ρ ∼n , being random and long enough to dominate in complexity (which computations cannot increase).
Thus
Since random strings contain k bits of information about ρ only with probability 2 −k and algorithms do not increase information (due to the Conservation Inequalities), Theorem 1 implies Corollary 1 The probability that a randomized algorithm computes on B n a total extension of u is at most O(2 −n )/m(K(n)|n). (Strengthening the o(1) bound of [Jockusch, Soare 72] .) (Thus, not all palettes, formal theories, etc. allow randomness-based tilings, completions, etc.) Of course, nobody envisioned choosing fundamental Math axioms by coin flips. Yet, Theorem 1 supports a more general impossibility. Just like the usual interpretation of Gödel Theorem is a matter of accepting Church's Thesis, judging if Theorem 1 makes the completion task impossible is a matter of accepting the Independence Postulate discussed in the appendix.
Appendix: The Independence Postulate.
IP: Let X be a sequence defined with an n-bit mathematical statement (e.g., in PA or set theory). Suppose a sequence Y can be located in the physical world with a k-bit instruction set. Then I(X : Y ) < k+n+c, for some small absolute constant c.
(Note that X and Y can each have much more than k+n+c bits of information.)
Thus, a (physical) sequence of all mathematical publications has little information about the (mathematical) sequence of all true statements of arithmetic. This is of little concern because the latter has, in turn, little information about the stock market (a physical sequence). :-)
Of course, Kolmogorov information is not the only desirable commodity. Yet, IP has interesting applications [L 84] . It can be restated as a "finitary" version of the Church-Turing thesis (CT) by calling recursive those finite sequences with recursive descriptions nearly as short as any their "higher-level" math descriptions. IP postulates that only such recursive sequences exist in reality.
Let me add (in order of increasing relevance) some comparisons between IP and CT:
1. IP is stated with greater care than CT: Obviously not all strings we generate are algorithmic (non-communist election results better not be :-). Only mathematically defined strings need be algorithmic to be generatable. IP includes this math clause explicitly, CT rarely does.
2. IP is simpler, CT more abstract. All sequences we ever see are computable just by being finite: CT is useless for them! IP works equally well for finite and infinite sequences.
3. IP is easier to support: CT is usually stated with vague reasoning. IP has broad conservation laws to support it and a general intuition that target information cannot be increased.
4. IP is much stronger: CT prohibits only generating the target math sequence itself; IP bars all strings with any significant information about it.
One application is dousing Gödel's hope cited in the Introduction, regardless of any realizable process of axiom selection. The argument is "inductive". It seems, complicated processes we observe, can ultimately be explained, i.e., reduced to simpler ones. These reductions use deterministic models and random ones, but neither can increase the starting information about a target. The toolkit of our models may change (e.g., quantum amplitudes work somewhat differently than probabilities) but it is hard to expect new realistic primitives allowing such "information leaks". So, if complicated processes generate unlimited target information, so must do some elementary processes, that admit no further explanations (reductions to simpler processes). The existence of such elementary unexplainable information Sources cannot be ruled out. Yet Infidels :-) can postulate it away. Just like the impossibility of generating power from uniform heat, this is an unprovable postulate, supported by proven arguments.
Note that the above argument is based on Independence Conservation Inequalities (ICI) of [L 74, L 84] . They deal with generation of strings by deterministic algorithms or by random processes from other strings. If the preexisting string has no significant target information, neither will the generated one. And despite being intuitive, ICI are not technically trivial and should not be confused with the easy remark that randomized algorithms cannot generate from scratch information about math targets, such as e.g., r.e. reals. (Math community never tried choosing their fundamental axioms this way :-). But the difficulty pays off, being essential for the inductive nature of the support ICI give to IP.
